[52359] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: TPM & disk crypto
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (James A. Donald)
Fri Oct 13 09:19:05 2006
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2006 10:54:42 +1000
From: "James A. Donald" <jamesd@echeque.com>
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <TheMailAgent.83f11c98a55d4@248ee15778f46492a420>
James A. Donald:
>> Well obviously I trust myself, and do not trust
>> anyone else all that much, so if I am the user, what
>> good is trusted computing?
>>
>> One use is that I can know that my operating system
>> has not changed behind the scenes, perhaps by a
>> rootkit, know that not only have I not changed the
>> operating system, but no one else has changed the
>> operating system.
Alexander Klimov wrote:
> The argument that TPM can prevent trojans seems to
> imply that the trojans are installed by modification
> of raw storage while the OS is offline.
No it does not.
> Btw, how the TCG allows to regularly change the kernel
> for security patches and still keep the same
> ``reported hash''?
It can report that the hash is a value that has
been blessed by signed software - and can report that
its list of reputable signing authorities is blessed by
Microsoft, and does not include me.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@metzdowd.com
