[45763] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
interesting HMAC attack results
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Perry E. Metzger)
Sat Sep 23 08:51:54 2006
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From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2006 09:42:03 -0400
http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/319
Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2006/319
Forgery and Partial Key-Recovery Attacks on HMAC and NMAC Using Hash Collisions
Scott Contini and Yiqun Lisa Yin
Abstract. In this paper, we analyze the security of HMAC and NMAC,
both of which are hash-based message authentication codes. We present
distinguishing, forgery, and partial key recovery attacks on HMAC and
NMAC using collisions of MD4, MD5, SHA-0, and reduced SHA-1. Our
results demonstrate that the strength of a cryptographic scheme can be
greatly weakened by the insecurity of the underlying hash function.
[I Heard about this paper from ekr's blog.]
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