[44162] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
RE: A note on vendor reaction speed to the e=3 problem
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Whyte, William)
Mon Sep 18 07:30:22 2006
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Sun, 17 Sep 2006 15:36:12 -0400
From: "Whyte, William" <WWhyte@ntru.com>
To: "James A. Donald" <jamesd@echeque.com>
Cc: "Peter Gutmann" <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>,
<cryptography@metzdowd.com>
> > Anyway, the attack applies even if you throw away the
> > ASN.1 data.
>=20
> If you ignore the ASN.1 data you expect the hash to be
> in a fixed byte position, so the attack does not apply.
It's correct that the attack doesn't apply if you expect
the hash to be in a fixed byte position. I would say that
it's incorrect that there was no chance of it being screwed=20
up in the absence of ASN.1. But I'm happy to agree to
disagree at this point.
William
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