[43894] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
RE: A note on vendor reaction speed to the e=3 problem
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Whyte, William)
Sun Sep 17 11:23:43 2006
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Sat, 16 Sep 2006 18:46:47 -0400
From: "Whyte, William" <WWhyte@ntru.com>
To: "James A. Donald" <jamesd@echeque.com>,
"Peter Gutmann" <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>,
<cryptography@metzdowd.com>
> > RFC-2440 actually gives the exact bytes to use for the
> > ASN.1 stuff, which nicely cuts down on ambiguity.
>=20
> This amounts to *not* using ASN.1 - treating the ASN.1
> data as mere arbitrary padding bits, devoid of
> information content.
Again, not quite right. You have to do a memcmp() and
make sure you've got the right arbitrary padding bits.
Anyway, the attack applies even if you throw away the
ASN.1 data.=20
William
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