[20326] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive

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Re: NPR : E-Mail Encryption Rare in Everyday Use

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (James A. Donald)
Wed Mar 8 12:08:40 2006

X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Thu, 02 Mar 2006 06:14:49 +1000
From: "James A. Donald" <jamesd@echeque.com>
To: Bill Stewart <bill.stewart@pobox.com>
Cc: Trevor Perrin <trevp@trevp.net>, cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <6.2.1.2.0.20060228231628.035e3b58@pop.idiom.com>

     --
Bill Stewart wrote:
 > The real question with ECC, other than patents, which don't seem to
 > interfere too much right now and will gradually go away, is how long
 > the keys need to be, and how long they can be trusted. ~~160-bit
 > keys were short enough to be convenient. 256-bit is probably about
 > the limit - I've seen some discussion of 512-bit keys, and at that
 > point you're pushed into message formats that make it inconvenient
 > to exchange keys again. Is there a consensus view about what
 > keylengths are reliable?

Except for special cases, breaking an n bit ECC system involves
2^(n/2) EC operations, and EC operations are slow.

So 160 bits is sufficient, and 255 bits small enough to hand the keys
around.

     --digsig
          James A. Donald
      6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG
      p2QzZm1xG7xN9AVFcM1MUIw3KDIAp2MG0bf6c6UU
      4hqypUw7qHAIittFmiU/1gQOoNSxTS+vQdHdbb0nT

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