[20148] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: NPR : E-Mail Encryption Rare in Everyday Use
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Nicolas Rachinsky)
Tue Feb 28 13:40:03 2006
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Sun, 26 Feb 2006 17:40:22 +0100
From: Nicolas Rachinsky <crypto-0@ml.turing-complete.org>
To: Ed Gerck <edgerck@nma.com>
Cc: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>,
Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>, cryptography@metzdowd.com
Mail-Followup-To: Nicolas Rachinsky <crypto-0@ml.turing-complete.org>,
Ed Gerck <edgerck@nma.com>, Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>,
Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>, cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <4400C81B.4040708@nma.com>
* Ed Gerck <edgerck@nma.com> [2006-02-25 13:11 -0800]:
> Finally, the properties of MY public-key will directly affect the
> confidentiality
> properties of YOUR envelope. For example, if (on purpose or by force) my
> public-key
> enables a covert channel (eg, weak key, key escrow, shared private key),
> YOUR
> envelope is compromised from the start and you have no way of knowing it.
> This is
> quite different from an address, which single purpose is to route the
> communication.
>
> That's I said the postal analogue of the public-key is the envelope.
I don't agree with that analogue. An paper envelope does not prevent
anybody from opening it (you can open it without any tools and with
nearly no effort). The encryption should make it impossible for
anybody to see the contents. The recipient might detect that the
envelope was opened or replaced, but you must trust that he will
detect this (you can't check it yourself).
Nicolas
--
http://www.rachinsky.de/nicolas
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