[19887] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: serious threat models
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Peter Gutmann)
Wed Feb 8 11:19:06 2006
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com, smb@cs.columbia.edu
In-Reply-To: <20060203022831.80D403BFDE3@berkshire.machshav.com>
Date: Mon, 06 Feb 2006 01:23:59 +1300
"Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@cs.columbia.edu> writes:
>What makes this interesting is how it was done: software was installed on the
>switch that diverted calls to a prepaid phone. Think about who could manage
>that.
Just in case people think the answer is "The MIB", it's actually "Any kid with
a bit of technical knowledge". Susan Dreyfus' book "Underground", for
example, documents hackers playing around inside cellular phone switches in
Europe. So although the target list looks like a typical intelligence agency
hitlist, it could also have been done by a joyriding teenager interested in
listening in on what politicians, the military, and journalists were saying
and hearing.
(Yes, I know the evidence points at the MIB, but that doesn't automatically
mean it was them).
Peter.
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