[19781] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: thoughts on one time pads
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Steven M. Bellovin)
Sat Jan 28 12:37:34 2006
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From: "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@cs.columbia.edu>
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: (Your message of "Sat, 28 Jan 2006 20:24:49 +1300.")
<E1F2kS1-0001xC-00@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Sat, 28 Jan 2006 12:20:53 -0500
How high-assurance are these CD destruction methods? I don't recall
seeing any articles on CD data recovery under normal conditions, let
alone these. As always, it depends on your threat model. (Aside: to
me, the only reason for using one-time pads is because you don't trust
conventional encryption algorithms. Given that AES is rated for top
secret traffic by NSA, I will assert that any enemy who has a chance of
attacking it can devote considerable resources to data recovery from
smashed CDs.)
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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