[18540] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [dave@farber.net: [IP] more on ARMSTRONG LECTURE on Quantum
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Ian G)
Wed Sep 21 16:19:10 2005
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Wed, 21 Sep 2005 10:43:06 +0100
From: Ian G <iang@systemics.com>
To: Eugen Leitl <eugen@leitl.org>
Cc: Cryptography List <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
In-Reply-To: <20050920082511.GC2249@leitl.org>
Eugen Leitl forwarded:
> The one possibly interesting use of QKD is for the super-paranoid: those
> who believe their traffic is being snooped today, and don't want it
> decrypted fifty years from now when theoretical and technological
> advances render all classical cryptography breakable (!?!).
There's two problems with this - I can't think of
a valid use case where anyone would need to keep a
secret for 50 years. That *is* the
time that states set ... and when you read about
the stuff that does get released after that time,
nothing stands out as having to have been protected
for that long.
Secondly, if we are talking about protecting fiber,
just add some additional packets. Fill it up. You
can put enough stuff over the fiber to fill up
disk drives within seconds, so what sort of adversary
are we talking about that wants to keep fiber-loads
of data for 50 years?
Quantum Key Exchange has all the hallmarks of a cute
toy for boys in big companies, and none of the hallmarks
of a useful application. It's not even like the laser,
stuck with a cool physics waiting for someone to work
out what to do with it.
iang
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