[18224] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: How many wrongs do you need to make a right?
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Anne & Lynn Wheeler)
Wed Aug 17 22:05:46 2005
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Wed, 17 Aug 2005 11:42:21 -0600
From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Cc: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
In-Reply-To: <43035D2E.80807@garlic.com>
as an aside, PKIs have attempted to moved into the no-value market segment.
as internet and online have become more and more ubiquitous the original
offline market segment for PKI has drastically dwindled ... i.e. a
certification authority certifying information and freely distributing
that certified information for the benefit of parties that don't have
access to the information themselves ... i.e. turning them into relying
parties, parties that rely on the digital certificates (certification of
information by certification authorities).
In the past, these relying parties were operations that didn't have
their own information and no capability for contacting any authoritative
agency directly responsible for the information and/or directly
contacting certification authorities. This is my analogy to the the
"letters of credit" from the sailing ship days.
As internet and online have become more and more ubiquitous (as well as
the general decline in dataprocessing costs), situations where parties
don't have their own copy of the information and/or aren't directly able
to contact somebody with the information ... is rapidly disappearing.
What is remaining are operations that still can't justify the cost of
thier own copy of the information (rapidly disappearing with the drastic
decline in the general cost of dataprocessing) and/or can't justify the
cost of directly contacting somebody with the information ... becoming
more and more difficult to find such a market niche as the cost of
online operation is rapdily declining and becoming ubiquitously available.
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