[18213] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: How many wrongs do you need to make a right?
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Florian Weimer)
Wed Aug 17 11:04:54 2005
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
From: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
To: "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@cs.columbia.edu>
Cc: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann),
cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Wed, 17 Aug 2005 15:24:17 +0200
In-Reply-To: <20050817124019.0584A3BFDC5@berkshire.machshav.com> (Steven
M. Bellovin's message of "Wed, 17 Aug 2005 08:40:19 -0400")
* Steven M. Bellovin:
> In message <87br3wdal7.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>, Florian Weimer writes:
>
>>
>>Can't you strip the certificates which have expired from the CRL? (I
>>know that with OpenPGP, you can't, but that's a different story.)
>>
>>OTOH, I wouldn't be concerned by the file size, although it's
>>certainly annoying. I would be really worried that the contents of
>>that CRL leaks sensitive information. At least from a privacy point
>>of view, this is a big, big problem, especially if you include some
>>indication which allows you to judge the validity of old signatures.
>>
>
> One can easily conceive of schemes that don't have such problems, such
> as simply publishing the hash of revoked certificates, or using a Bloom
> filter based on the hashes.
This doesn't completely eliminate the data leak, as a long as the
certificates were used in end-to-end communications. Analysis for
relative outsiders becomes harder, though.
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