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Re: solving the wrong problem

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Peter Fairbrother)
Mon Aug 8 14:04:56 2005

X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Mon, 08 Aug 2005 17:59:34 +0100
From: Peter Fairbrother <zenadsl6186@zen.co.uk>
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>,
	<cryptography@metzdowd.com>, <perry@piermont.com>
In-Reply-To: <E1E274P-0001rr-00@medusa01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>

Peter Gutmann wrote:

> Peter Fairbrother <zenadsl6186@zen.co.uk> writes:
>> Perry E. Metzger wrote:
>>> Frequently, scientists who know nothing about security come up with
>>> ingenious ways to solve non-existent problems. Take this, for example:
>>> 
>>> http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?chanID=sa003&articleID=00049DB6-ED96-12E7-A
>>> D9
>>> 683414B7F0000
>>> 
>>> Basically, some clever folks have found a way to "fingerprint" the
>>> fiber pattern in a particular piece of paper so that they know they
>>> have a particular piece of paper on hand.
>> 
>> Didn't the people who did US/USSR nuclear arms verification do something
>> very similar, except the characterised surface was sparkles in plastic
>> painted on the missile rather than paper?
> 
> Yes.  The intent was that forging the fingerprint on a warhead should cost as
> much or more than the warhead itself.

Talking of solving the wrong problem, that's a pretty bad metric - forging
should cost the damage an extra warhead would do, rather than the cost of an
extra warhead. That's got to be in the trillions, rather than a few hundred
thousand for another warhead.


-- 
Peter Fairbrother


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