[17720] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Why Blockbuster looks at your ID.
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Edgar Danielyan)
Sat Jul 9 11:02:19 2005
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2005 18:50:17 +0100
From: Edgar Danielyan <e.danielyan@gmail.com>
Reply-To: Edgar Danielyan <e.danielyan@gmail.com>
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <87psttdxr6.fsf@snark.piermont.com>
May we see the back of that envelope? Upgrade to EMV (chip & PIN) here
in UK reportedly costs around 1.1 billion pounds (around $1.9
billion), and that is simply an upgrade to the existing infrastructure
and only in a single country. To fundamentally change the system would
require tens of billions and a concerted effort of banks, the
associations and the merchants, with all the associated hidden agendas
and underwater currents. It would be too big an undertaking with an
uncomfortable C/B ratio, whereas $788m in losses is not that bad
keeping in mind the amounts involved...
On 7/8/05, Perry E. Metzger <perry@piermont.com> wrote:
>=20
> Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com> writes:
> > Credit card fraud has gone *down* since 1992, and is actually falling:
> >
> > 1992: $2.6B
> > 2003: $882M
> > 2004: $788M
> >
> > We're on the order of 4.7 cents on the $100.
> >
> > http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jun2005/tc20050621_3238_=
tc024.htm
> >
> > If it's any consolation, I was rather surprised myself.
>=20
> I seem to have gotten that one drastically wrong. Thanks for the
> more accurate figures.
>=20
> A back of the envelope calculation makes me think that it is still
> more than enough money to provide a good incentive for a change in
> systems, though, especially when the cost of the anti-fraud measures
> needed at every part of the system are taken in to account.
>=20
> Perry
>
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