[17516] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: RSA signatures without padding
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (James Muir)
Mon Jun 20 22:32:22 2005
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2005 22:17:28 -0400
From: James Muir <jamuir@math.uwaterloo.ca>
To: Taral <taralx@gmail.com>, cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <fa0147d90506201818fc01d43@mail.gmail.com>
Taral wrote:
> On 6/20/05, James Muir <jamuir@math.uwaterloo.ca> wrote:
>
>>The attack I am trying to recall is a chosen-message attack and its
>>efficiency is related to the probability that a random 128-bit integer can
>>be factorized over a small set of primes (ie. the prob that a uniformily
>>selected 128-bit integer is "B-smooth" for a small integer B). Basically,
>>you pick a message for which you'd like to forge a signature, find a variant
>>of the message that hashes to a B-smooth 128-bit integer, and then you
>>construct the forgery after solving a linear system modulo e (the linear
>>system incorporates the signatures on the chosen messages).
>
>
> I think you're referring to the Desmedt-Odlyzko selective forgery attack.
>
> See http://www.ipa.go.jp/security/enc/CRYPTREC/fy15/doc/1014_Menezes.sigs.pdf
Yes, that's it. Thanks for the URL.
-James
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