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Re: de-identification

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Steven M. Bellovin)
Thu Jun 16 22:18:57 2005

X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
From: "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@cs.columbia.edu>
To: dan@geer.org
Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Wed, 08 Jun 2005 16:19:06 EDT."
             <20050608201906.F3E6C1BF9AD@absinthe.tinho.net> 
Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2005 17:56:54 -0400

In message <20050608201906.F3E6C1BF9AD@absinthe.tinho.net>, dan@geer.org writes
:
>
>Ladies and Gentlemen,
>
>I'd like to come up to speed on the state of the
>art in de-identification (~=anonymization) of data
>especially monitoring data (firewall/hids logs, say).
>A little googling suggests that this is an academic
>subspeciality as well as a word with many interpretations.
>If someone here can point me at the mother lode of 
>insight, I would be most grateful.
>

What's your threat model?  It's proved to be a very hard problem to 
solve, since there are all sorts of other channels -- application data, 
timing data (the remote fingerprinting paper mentioned this one), etc.

		--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb



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