[17370] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Papers about "Algorithm hiding" ?
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Bill Stewart)
Mon Jun 6 15:43:11 2005
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Mon, 06 Jun 2005 02:43:44 -0700
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
From: Bill Stewart <bill.stewart@pobox.com>
In-Reply-To: <42703.207.236.193.195.1117829658.squirrel@mail.okiok.com>
At 01:14 PM 6/3/2005, astiglic@okiok.com wrote:
>I think we are already in a state where practically everybody that has a
>computer has crypto available, and it's not difficult to use it!
Of course they have it -
the problem is having crypto in a way that's not suspicious,
and "suspicious" is highly dependent on your threat model.
For instance, Microsoft Word has crypto -
it's lousy crypto, which isn't directly relevant here,
but it's a utility that people view as normal,
while PGP is inherently suspicious-looking.
No reason that OpenOffice couldn't have crypto that's actually reasonable
quality.
The "rename the binaries" strategy is probably more reliable than
cyphersaber etc.
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