[17255] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: how email encryption should work (and how to get it used...)
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Amir Herzberg)
Wed May 25 11:23:08 2005
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Wed, 25 May 2005 09:25:24 +0200
From: Amir Herzberg <herzbea@macs.biu.ac.il>
Reply-To: herzbea@macs.biu.ac.il
To: "James A. Donald" <jamesd@echeque.com>
Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <42903824.21192.16F27EA7@localhost>
James A. Donald responded to me:
>
>>A missing element is motivation for getting something
>>like this deployed... I think spam could offer such
>>motivation; and, I strongly believe that a
>>cryptographic protocol to penalize spammers could be
>>one of the most important tools against spam.
>
> The cure for spam is not a provable link to a true name,
> but a provable link to a domain name.
I disagree. I believe that _accountability_ is a key element in stopping
spam, and that cryptographic protocols (such as SICS) offer the best
mechanisms to ensure accountability of spam. A `provable link to domain
name`, imho, is merely a specific method of accountability (in the
domain level), which is useful, but not necessarily optimal, esp.
considering the need to support mobile users and many domains, not all
fully trustworthy.
>
> The problem with adoption is that this is only
> beneficial against spam if widely used. We face the
> usual critical mass problem.
Agreed here and indeed a focal point in this effort should definitely be
providing value to early adopters. I believe we can provide such early
advantages better via spam-fighting mechanisms, such as secure protocol
between multiple spam-aware mail agents (MTA-MTA, MTA-MUA)); so that's
what we are developing in SICS. I believe these efforts are
complementary to providing encryption services.
Best, Amir Herzberg
---------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@metzdowd.com
