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Re: SSL/TLS passive sniffing

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Greg Rose)
Tue Jan 4 16:24:58 2005

X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Tue, 04 Jan 2005 12:10:11 -0800
To: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
From: Greg Rose <ggr@qualcomm.com>
Cc: John Denker <jsd@av8n.com>, cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <87u0qeknm9.fsf@deneb.enyo.de>

At 22:51 2004-12-22 +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
>* John Denker:
>
> > Florian Weimer wrote:
> >
> >> Would you recommend to switch to /dev/urandom (which doesn't block if
> >> the entropy estimate for the in-kernel pool reaches 0), and stick to
> >> generating new DH parameters for each connection,
> >
> > No, I wouldn't.
>
>Not even for the public parameters?

Am I understanding correctly? Does SSL/TLS really generate a new P and G 
for each connection? If so, can someone explain the rationale behind this? 
It seems insane to me. And not doing so would certainly ease the problem on 
the entropy pool, not to mention CPU load for primality testing.

I must be misunderstanding. Surely. Please?

Greg.



Greg Rose                                    INTERNET: ggr@qualcomm.com
Qualcomm Incorporated     VOICE: +1-858-651-5733   FAX: +1-858-651-5766
5775 Morehouse Drive                    http://people.qualcomm.com/ggr/
San Diego, CA 92121   232B EC8F 44C6 C853 D68F E107 E6BF CD2F 1081 A37C


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