|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| home | help | back | first | fref | pref | prev | next | nref | lref | last | post |
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2004 23:21:13 +0000 From: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk> To: Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org> Cc: Ondrej Mikle <ondrej.mikle@gmail.com>, Cryptography <cryptography@metzdowd.com> In-Reply-To: <20041214230939.GA29331@bitchcake.off.net> Adam Back wrote: > I thought the usual attack posited when one can find a collision on a > source checksum is to make the desired change to source, then tinker > with something less obvious and more malleable like lsbits of a UI > image file until you find your collision on two input source packages. Quite so, but the "desired change to source" is either not visible, or suspicious. If it's not visible, then just make it malicious. And if it's suspicious then it shouldn't be run. Cheers, Ben. -- http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html http://www.thebunker.net/ "There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he doesn't mind who gets the credit." - Robert Woodruff --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@metzdowd.com
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| home | help | back | first | fref | pref | prev | next | nref | lref | last | post |