[16542] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: The Pointlessness of the MD5 "attacks"
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Adam Back)
Tue Dec 14 18:32:01 2004
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2004 18:09:39 -0500
From: Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>
To: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>
Cc: Ondrej Mikle <ondrej.mikle@gmail.com>,
Cryptography <cryptography@metzdowd.com>,
Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org>
In-Reply-To: <41BF6678.6000109@algroup.co.uk>
I thought the usual attack posited when one can find a collision on a
source checksum is to make the desired change to source, then tinker
with something less obvious and more malleable like lsbits of a UI
image file until you find your collision on two input source packages.
Adam
On Tue, Dec 14, 2004 at 10:17:28PM +0000, Ben Laurie wrote:
> >>But the only way I can see to exploit this would be to have code that
> >>did different things based on the contents of some bitmap. My contention
> >>is that if the code is open, then it will be obvious that it does
> >>"something bad" if a bit is tweaked, and so will be suspicious, even if
> >>the "something bad" is not triggered in the version seen.
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