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Re: public-key: the wrong model for email?

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Adam Shostack)
Thu Sep 16 12:18:20 2004

X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 2004 11:54:35 -0400
From: Adam Shostack <adam@homeport.org>
To: Ed Gerck <egerck@nma.com>
Cc: "Weger, B.M.M. de" <b.m.m.d.weger@TUE.nl>,
	cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <4149574B.800@nma.com>

Given our failure to deploy PKC in any meaningful way*, I think that
systems like Voltage, and the new PGP Universal are great.

* I don't see Verisign's web server tax as meaningful; they accept no
liability, and numerous companies foist you off to unrelted domains.
We could get roughly the same security level from fully opportunistic
or memory-oportunistic models.

Adam

On Thu, Sep 16, 2004 at 02:05:15AM -0700, Ed Gerck wrote:
| Benne,
| 
| With Voltage, all communications corresponding to the same public key can be
| decrypted using the same private key, even if the user is offline. To me, 
| this
| sounds worse than the PKC problem of trusting the recipient's key. Voltage
| also corresponds to mandatory key escrow, as you noted, with all its 
| drawbacks.
| 
| Cheers,
| Ed Gerck
| 
| Weger, B.M.M. de wrote:
| 
| >Hi Ed,
| >
| >What about ID-based crypto: the public key can be any string, such as
| >your e-mail address. So the sender can encrypt even before the
| >recipient has a key pair. The private key is derived from the ...
| 
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