[16088] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
RE: Kerberos Design
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Cid Carlos)
Mon Sep 6 16:38:44 2004
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
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From: Cid Carlos <Carlos.Cid@rhul.ac.uk>
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Cc: 'Thomas Themel' <themel@iwoars.net>
Date: Thu, 2 Sep 2004 10:06:53 +0100
Hi,
You may want to have a look at these:
- Designing an Authentication System: a Dialogue in Four Scenes
(http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/dialogue.html)
- Limitations of the Kerberos Authentication System, Steven M. Bellovin, and
Michael Merrit, 1991
(http://www.cybersafe.ltd.uk/docs_other/Limitations%20of%20the%20Kerberos%20
Authentication%20System.pdf)
Carlos
==================
Hi,
I'm currently looking into implementing a single sign-on solution for
distributed services.
The requirement profile seems to somewhat fit Kerberos, but I'm not entirely
convinced that I can use it in my scenario - which can't simply run an
off-the-shelf KDC and use UDP for communication with it.
However, years of reading various crypto resources have strongly conditioned
me against simple-minded attempts to "roll my own" as a crypto dilletante.
I've been trying to study Kerberos' design history in the recent past and
have failed to come up with a good resource that explains why things are
built the way they are.
Since I'm already using OpenSSL for various SSL/x.509 related things, I'm
most astonished by the almost total absence of public key cryptography in
Kerberos, and I haven't been able to find out why this design choice was
made - performance reasons, given that at its inception public key operation
cost was probably much more prohibitive?
So, I'd like to ask the audience:
- Is there a good web/book/whatever resource regarding the design
of Kerberos? Amazon offers the O'Reilly book, which, from the
abstract, seems to take the cryptographic design of Kerberos as
a given and concentrates on its usage, and another one that also
doesn't seem to give much detail on the issue. Something in the
direction of EKR's SSL/TLS book would be very much appreciated.
- Is Kerberos a sane choice to adapt for such solutions today?
Is there anything more recent that I should be aware of?
thanks,
--
[*Thomas Themel*]
[extended contact] But let your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay:
[info provided in] for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.
[*message header*] - Matthew 5:37
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