[15978] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Microsoft .NET PRNG (fwd)
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Ben Laurie)
Sun Aug 22 11:49:10 2004
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Sun, 22 Aug 2004 15:59:18 +0100
From: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>
To: Anton Stiglic <astiglic@okiok.com>
Cc: "'J.A. Terranson'" <measl@mfn.org>, cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <20040810032039.03D35B4072@mail.okiok.com>
Anton Stiglic wrote:
> There is some detail in the FIPS 140 security policy of Microsoft's
> cryptographic provider, for Windows XP and Windows 2000. See for example
> http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/140-1/140sp/140sp238.pdf
>
> where they say the RNG is based on FIPS 186 RNG using SHS. The seed is
> based on the collection of allot of data, enumerated in the security policy.
>
> I would guess that what is written is true, less NIST would look very bad if
> someone reversed engineered the code and showed that what they certified was
> wrong.
>
> So based on that it would seem that the PRNG in recent Microsoft
> cryptographic providers is o.k.
That's if you think FIPS 186 is OK, which by many standards, it is not
(I had occasion to look at it closely when doing FIPS 140 for OpenSSL).
Cheers,
Ben.
--
http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html http://www.thebunker.net/
"There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he
doesn't mind who gets the credit." - Robert Woodruff
---------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@metzdowd.com
