[15732] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive

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Re: EZ Pass and the fast lane ....

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Jon Snader)
Sat Jul 10 18:43:23 2004

X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Sat, 10 Jul 2004 13:45:40 -0400
From: Jon Snader <jsnader@ix.netcom.com>
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Mail-Followup-To: Jon Snader <jsnader@ix.netcom.com>,
	cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <6.0.0.22.2.20040710102358.037a81d8@203.30.171.17>

On Sat, Jul 10, 2004 at 10:28:49AM +1000, Greg Rose wrote:
> 
> If they could do that reliably, they wouldn't need the toll thingy, nu? I 
> have been told by someone in the photo-enforcement industry that their 
> reliability is only around 75%, and they're very expensive, and ... anyway, 
> not a viable solution to the problem given the current economics. But to a 
> weekly commuter over one of the bridges in New York, for example, it's 
> $1000 per year.
> 

Just today I read the following remark by Brad Delong on Eric
Rescorla's Web site <http://tinyurl.com/3aw8a>:

    The IRS's comparative advantage is using random terror to
        elicit voluntary compliance with the tax code on the part of
        relatively rich people.

Doesn't a similar principle apply here?  Let's grant, as you say,
that the system is only 75% effective, and perhaps the expense
prevents us from deploying it at every lane so that the
probability of catching a cheater is, say, only 40%.  If we make
the fine for cheating $5000 and/or 6 months in jail, then the
cheater's expected savings, considering just the fine, is -$1994,
assuming a $10 toll.  That seems like a pretty good deterrent to
me.

jcs

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