[15728] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: EZ Pass and the fast lane ....
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Greg Rose)
Sat Jul 10 11:49:41 2004
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Sat, 10 Jul 2004 10:28:49 +1000
To: Ian Grigg <iang@systemics.com>
From: Greg Rose <ggr@qualcomm.com>
Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <40EF0622.2050409@systemics.com>
At 21:54 2004-07-09 +0100, Ian Grigg wrote:
>John Gilmore wrote:
>>>It would be relatively easy to catch someone
>>>doing this - just cross-correlate with other
>>>information (address of home and work) and
>>>then photograph the car at the on-ramp.
>>
>>Am I missing something?
>>It seems to me that EZ Pass spoofing should become as popular as
>>cellphone cloning, until they change the protocol. You pick up a
>>tracking number by listening to other peoples' transmissions, then
>>impersonate them once so that their account gets charged for your toll
>>(or so that it looks like their car is traveling down a monitored
>>stretch of road). It should be easy to automate picking up dozens or
>>hundreds of tracking numbers while just driving around; and this can
>>foil both track-the-whole-populace surveillance, AND toll collection.
>>Miscreants would appear to be other cars; tracking them would not
>>be feasible.
>
>Well, I am presuming that ... the EZ Pass
>does have an account number, right? And
>then, the car does have a licence place?
>
>So, just correlate the account numbers
>with the licence plates as they go through
>the gates.
If they could do that reliably, they wouldn't need the toll thingy, nu? I
have been told by someone in the photo-enforcement industry that their
reliability is only around 75%, and they're very expensive, and ... anyway,
not a viable solution to the problem given the current economics. But to a
weekly commuter over one of the bridges in New York, for example, it's
$1000 per year.
>What incentive does a miscreant have to
>reprogram hundreds or thousands of other
>cars???
Until recently, when viruses and worms started to be used to assist
spamming, what incentive did a miscreant have to invade hundreds or
thousands of computers?
Greg.
Greg Rose INTERNET: ggr@qualcomm.com
Qualcomm Australia VOICE: +61-2-9817 4188 FAX: +61-2-9817 5199
Level 3, 230 Victoria Road, http://people.qualcomm.com/ggr/
Gladesville NSW 2111/232B EC8F 44C6 C853 D68F E107 E6BF CD2F 1081 A37C
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