[15279] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (R. Hirschfeld)
Fri Apr 9 11:17:45 2004
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Fri, 9 Apr 2004 02:38:21 +0200
From: "R. Hirschfeld" <ray@unipay.nl>
To: iang@systemics.com
Cc: ptrei@rsasecurity.com, mv@cdc.gov, cryptography@metzdowd.com,
cypherpunks@al-qaeda.net
In-reply-to: <407459B7.2030609@systemics.com> (message from Ian Grigg on Wed,
07 Apr 2004 15:42:47 -0400)
Reply-To: ray@unipay.nl
> Date: Wed, 07 Apr 2004 15:42:47 -0400
> From: Ian Grigg <iang@systemics.com>
>
> It seems to me that the requirement for after-the-vote
> verification ("to prove your vote was counted") clashes
> rather directly with the requirement to protect voters
> from coercion ("I can't prove I voted in a particular
> way.") or other incentives-based attacks.
>
> You can have one, or the other, but not both, right?
What you can have is for the voter to be able to verify that his/her
vote was properly counted without being able to prove it to anybody
else.
In that case, an individual claim that a vote was improperly counted
wouldn't be convincing, but a wide enough outcry might trigger a
recount.
I think this would add unnecessary and undesired complexity to a
political election voting system, though.
Ray
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