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Re: [Cryptography] Functional specification for email client?

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Ray Dillinger)
Fri Aug 30 19:57:00 2013

X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 16:50:44 -0700
From: Ray Dillinger <bear@sonic.net>
To: Jonathan Thornburg <jthorn@astro.indiana.edu>
In-Reply-To: <alpine.BSO.2.00.1308301651110.248@cobalt.astro.indiana.edu>
Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com

On 08/30/2013 01:52 PM, Jonathan Thornburg wrote:
> On Fri, 30 Aug 2013, Ray Dillinger wrote:
>> 3.  When an email user gets an email, s/he is absolutely sure that it comes
>>      from the person who holds the email address listed in its "from" line.
>>      S/he may or may not have any clue who that person is.  S/he is also
>>      sure that no one else has seen the contents of the email.
>
> This probably needs amending to deal with messages addressed to multiple
> recipients (either cc:, bcc:, or simply multiple to: addresses).
>

Right.

More generally, I was hoping for feedback as to whether this is a design
useful to and usable by ordinary people.

It's fairly straightforwardly implementable as a fully distributed system,
given the notion that "routing information" includes public key.  The only
slightly tricky issue is maintaining the coherence of the per-domain
routing databases among mutually suspicious clients, and there are existing
techniques for that.

It's also compatible with current standards for email payloads, so existing
infrastructure can easily be adapted; in the protocol stack, it looks like
any other MTA.

It can also fairly easily gateway to SMTP, but is not dependent on it.

				Bear


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