[145907] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Haystack redux
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Florian Weimer)
Mon Sep 27 20:07:42 2010
To: Adam Fields <cryptography23094893@aquick.org>
Cc: Jacob Appelbaum <jacob@appelbaum.net>, Steve Weis <steveweis@gmail.com>,
Alec Muffett <alec.muffett@gmail.com>, cryptography@metzdowd.com
From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@bfk.de>
Date: Wed, 22 Sep 2010 08:16:13 +0000
In-Reply-To: <20100915184815.GY13439@lola.ec2.internal> (Adam Fields's message of "Wed\, 15 Sep 2010 14\:48\:15 -0400")
* Adam Fields:
> I find it hard to believe that even the most uninformed dissidents
> would be using an untested, unaudited, _beta_, __foreign__ new service
> for anything. Is there any reason to believe otherwise?
I wouldn't be surprised if there are plenty such tools in circulation
which are used by various dissident groups. It's a cost-effective way
to infiltrate them.
The problem with such tools is that you can't really know how is
listening in on the proxies. Even if the software itself contains no
backdoors, the service as a whole might still be compromised. Even if
the proxies are trustworthy, your usage of the tool can very likely be
discovered by traffic analysis (and usage patterns as well, if you're
unlucky, and increasingly so if the service has low latency).
There is no technical solution to oppressive governments (or
non-trustworthy ISPs, for that matter). After all, if you're
anonymous and oppressed, you're still oppressed.
--=20
Florian Weimer <fweimer@bfk.de>
BFK edv-consulting GmbH http://www.bfk.de/
Kriegsstra=DFe 100 tel: +49-721-96201-1
D-76133 Karlsruhe fax: +49-721-96201-99
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