[145394] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: A mighty fortress is our PKI
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Sampo Syreeni)
Mon Jul 26 23:05:30 2010
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 2010 05:40:07 +0300 (EEST)
From: Sampo Syreeni <decoy@iki.fi>
To: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com>
cc: Jay Sakata <jay@edgecast.com>, cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <20100726222540.57f01314@jabberwock.cb.piermont.com>
X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: decoy@iki.fi
On 2010-07-26, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> I think that you may be right -- the entire TLS PKI model may be so
> horribly broken that, once you no longer have any real security to
> speak of, simply sharing a cert among hundreds of trust domains hardly
> harms anything further.
I agree. But do we then have any quantitative research on how bad this
sort of sharing really is, in excess of the basic cryptographic
vulnerability? Does the social network research of recent years yield
any numbers, for instance?
--
Sampo Syreeni, aka decoy - decoy@iki.fi, http://decoy.iki.fi/front
+358-50-5756111, 025E D175 ABE5 027C 9494 EEB0 E090 8BA9 0509 85C2
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