[145381] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: A Fault Attack Construction Based On Rijmen's Chosen-Text Relations Attack
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Bill Frantz)
Sun Jul 25 17:49:51 2010
Date: Sun, 25 Jul 2010 09:24:52 -0700
From: Bill Frantz <frantz@pwpconsult.com>
To: David Wagner <daw@cs.berkeley.edu>
cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com, Mark Miller <markm@caplet.com>
In-Reply-To: <201007211849.o6LIn59o007434@taverner.cs.berkeley.edu>
Alfonso De Gregorio wrote:
>The last Thursday, Vincent Rijmen announced a new clever attack=20
>on AES (and KASUMI) in a report posted to the Cryptology=20
>ePrint Archive: Practical-Titled Attack on AES-128 Using=20
>Chosen-Text Relations, http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/337
On 7/21/10 at 11:49 AM, daw@cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner)=20
wrote, with some drastic editing which I hope doesn't change=20
David's meaning:
>For what it's worth, I read Vincent Rijmen's paper ... as written with
>tongue embedded firmly in cheek: I took it as
>a serious argument, hidden behind some gentle humor.
>
>...
>
>Personally, I found it an effective communication style. I thought the
>point came across very clearly. And, I have to admit I enjoyed seeing
>someone having a spot of fun with what can otherwise be a somewhat dry
>topic. I thought it was brilliantly done.
My favorite paper in this style is one which has not (yet) been=20
published. It turns out that at one time there were at least=20
three Mark Millers active in computer science. One of them, cced=20
above, wanted to publish a paper:
Global Names Considered Harmful
by Mark Miller, Mark Miller, and Mark Miller
And the paper really doesn't need to go any further than this.
Cheers - Bill
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