[145279] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Quantum Key Distribution: the bad idea that won't die...
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Alexander Klimov)
Fri Jul 9 12:48:34 2010
Date: Mon, 24 May 2010 11:55:41 +0300
From: Alexander Klimov <alserkli@inbox.ru>
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <8739yq6szc.fsf@snark.cb.piermont.com>
<http://arxiv.org/abs/1005.2376>
Unconditional security proofs of various quantum key
distribution (QKD) protocols are built on idealized
assumptions. One key assumption is: the sender (Alice) can
prepare the required quantum states without errors. However,
such an assumption may be violated in a practical QKD system.
In this paper, we experimentally demonstrate a technically
feasible "intercept-and-resend" attack that exploits such
a security loophole in a commercial "plug & play" QKD system.
The resulting quantum bit error rate is 19.7%, which is below
the proven secure bound of 20.0% for the BB84 protocol.
--
Regards,
ASK
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