[144964] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Possibly questionable security decisions in DNS root management
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Nicolas Williams)
Mon Oct 19 11:53:31 2009
Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2009 10:24:40 -0500
From: Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@sun.com>
To: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com>
Cc: bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com, cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <87skdl1qgz.fsf@snark.cb.piermont.com>
Getting DNSSEC deployed with sufficiently large KSKs should be priority #1.
If 90 days for the 1024-bit ZSKs is too long, that can always be
reduced, or the ZSK keylength be increased -- we too can squeeze factors
of 10 from various places. In the early days of DNSSEC deployment the
opportunities for causing damage by breaking a ZSK will be relatively
meager. We have time to get this right; this issue does not strike me
as urgent.
OTOH, will we be able to detect breaks? A clever attacker will use
breaks in very subtle ways. A ZSK break would be bad, but something
that could be dealt with, *if* we knew it'd happened. The potential
difficulty of detecting attacks is probably the best reason for seeking
stronger keys well ahead of time.
Nico
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