[144915] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Barker, Elaine B.] NIST Publication Announcements
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Perry E. Metzger)
Thu Oct 1 10:59:26 2009
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com>
To: Stephan Neuhaus <neuhaus@st.cs.uni-sb.de>
Cc: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Thu, 01 Oct 2009 10:46:23 -0400
In-Reply-To: <060F8BD2-7C96-4F45-9294-E22075DAFB9A@st.cs.uni-sb.de> (Stephan
Neuhaus's message of "Thu, 1 Oct 2009 09:48:47 +0200")
Stephan Neuhaus <neuhaus@st.cs.uni-sb.de> writes:
>> I think you've abstracted away too much information to provide a
>> definite answer, but if all you want is a proof of something being
>> done at time X that'll stand up in court then what's wrong with going
>> to a notary? This has worked just fine for... centuries? without
>> requiring the pile of Rube-Goldberg cryptoplumbing that people seem
>> to want to attach to it.
>
> In this case, it's because Alice and Bob are not people, but services
> in an SOA, dynamically negotiating a variation of an SLA. If that SLA
> specifies, for example, that "patient records must be deleted within
> three days of checking the patient out of the hospital", then it will
> be somewhat impractical to go to a notary public every time they
> delete a patient's record.
It is also completely impossible to prove you've deleted a
record. Someone who can read the record can always make a copy of
it. Cryptography can't fix the DRM problem.
Perry
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