[144786] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management,
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (James A. Donald)
Wed Aug 26 22:20:13 2009
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2009 10:36:08 +1000
From: "James A. Donald" <jamesd@echeque.com>
To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
CC: ben@links.org, perry@piermont.com, cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <E1MgRwO-0000qB-F9@wintermute01.cs.auckland.ac.nz>
Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Consider for example a system that uses two
> authentication algorithms in case one fails, or that
> has an algorithm-upgrade/rollover capability, perhaps
> via downloadable plugins. At some point a device
> receives a message authenticated with algorithm A
> saying "Algorithm B has been broken, don't use it any
> more" (with an optional side-order of "install and run
> this plugin that implements a new algorithm instead").
> It also receives a message authenticated with
> algorithm B saying "Algorithm A has been broken, don't
> use it any more", with optional extras as before.
Not so hard. True breaks occur infrequently. Those
that download the scam version will find that they can
*only* communicate with the scammers, so will sort
things out in due course and all will be well until the
next break - which will not happen for a long time, and
may well never happen - unless of course one has the
IEEE 802.11 working group designing the standards.
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