[144766] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Certainty
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Paul Hoffman)
Sun Aug 23 16:28:00 2009
In-Reply-To: <916E42D4-E56E-460C-AA36-85BCF25C8AF1@mac.com>
<05DB686A-BAF4-4EB2-B7F5-6AA2E0445121@qualcomm.com>
Date: Sun, 23 Aug 2009 12:00:03 -0700
To: james hughes <hughejp@mac.com>,
Cryptography List <cryptography@metzdowd.com>,
Greg Rose <ggr@qualcomm.com>
From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
At 7:10 PM -0700 8/19/09, james hughes wrote:
>On Aug 19, 2009, at 3:28 PM, Paul Hoffman wrote:
>>I understand that "creaking" is not a technical cryptography term, but "certainly" is. When do we become "certain" that devastating attacks on one feature of hash functions (collision resistance) have any effect at all on even weak attacks on a different feature (either first or second preimages)?
>>
>>This is a serious question. Has anyone seen any research that took some of the excellent research on collision resistance and used it directly for preimage attacks, even with greatly reduced rounds?
>
>This is being done. What Perry said.
At 9:02 PM -0700 8/19/09, Greg Rose wrote:
>Not directly, as far as I know. But some research and success on preimages, yes.
Getting a straight answer on whether or not the recent preimage work is actually related to the earlier collision work would be useful.
--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium
---------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@metzdowd.com
