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Re: Factoring attack against RSA based on Pollard's Rho

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Ben Laurie)
Sun Jun 7 13:38:30 2009

Date: Sun, 07 Jun 2009 17:10:30 +0100
From: Ben Laurie <ben@links.org>
To: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
CC: Greg Perry <Greg.Perry@liveammo.com>, cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <p06240805c650b6976fa3@[10.20.30.158]>

Paul Hoffman wrote:
> At 8:07 PM -0700 6/5/09, Greg Perry wrote:
>> Greetings list members,
>> 
>> I have published a unique factoring method related to Pollard's Rho
>> that is published here:
>> 
>> http://blog.liveammo.com/2009/06/factoring-fun/
>> 
>> Any feedback would be appreciated.
> 
> Is there any practical value to this work? That's a serious question.
> The main statement about the value is "This is a factoring attack
> against RSA with an up to 80% reduction in the search candidates
> required for a conventional brute force key attack." Does that mean
> that it reduces the search space for a 1024-bit RSA key to, at best
> 205 bits (0.2 * 1024) of brute force?

No, no. You don't multiply by .2, you add log_2(.2), which is around -3.
So, 1021 bits.

-- 
http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html           http://www.links.org/

"There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he
doesn't mind who gets the credit." - Robert Woodruff

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