[143240] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: full-disk subversion standards released
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Taral)
Fri Jan 30 19:08:13 2009
In-Reply-To: <alpine.BSO.1.10.0901301639210.23528@oxygen.astro.indiana.edu>
Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 15:37:22 -0800
From: Taral <taralx@gmail.com>
To: Jonathan Thornburg <jthorn@astro.indiana.edu>
Cc: John Gilmore <gnu@toad.com>, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>, cryptography@metzdowd.com,
smb@cs.columbia.edu
On Fri, Jan 30, 2009 at 1:41 PM, Jonathan Thornburg
<jthorn@astro.indiana.edu> wrote:
> For open-source software encryption (be it swap-space, file-system,
> and/or full-disk), the answer is "yes": I can assess the developers'
> reputations, I can read the source code, and/or I can take note of
> what other people say who've read the source code.
Really? What about hardware backdoors? I'm thinking something like the
old /bin/login backdoor that had compiler support, but in hardware.
--
Taral <taralx@gmail.com>
"Please let me know if there's any further trouble I can give you."
-- Unknown
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