[14227] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: quantum hype
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Arnold G. Reinhold)
Sun Sep 21 10:29:52 2003
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <3F6A33DB.1080608@av8n.com>
Date: Sun, 21 Sep 2003 06:54:49 -0400
To: "John S. Denker" <jsd@av8n.com>,
crypto list <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
From: "Arnold G. Reinhold" <reinhold@world.std.com>
At 6:38 PM -0400 9/18/03, John S. Denker wrote:
>
>Yes, Mallory can DoS the setup by reading (and thereby
>trashing) every bit. But Mallory can DoS the setup by
>chopping out a piece of the cable. The two are equally
>effective and equally detectable. Chopping is cheaper and
>easier.
>
>Other key-exchange methods such as DH are comparably
>incapable of solving the DoS problem. So why bring up
>the issue?
It seems to me that because key-exchange methods such as DH only
depend on exchanging bits (as opposed to specifying a physical
layer), they can rely on a wide variety of techniques to combat DoS.
If Bob and Alice can safeguard their local connections to the
Internet, its multi-routing properties provide significant DoS
protection. Other options available to them include the switched
telephone network, wireless, LEO satellites, cybercafes,
steganography, HF radio, and even postal mail. In addition, DH users
have no need to call attention to themselves by leasing a fiber-optic
line.
Arnold Reinhold
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