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Re: fyi: bear/enforcer open-source TCPA project

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Sean Smith)
Tue Sep 9 11:07:34 2003

X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Mon, 08 Sep 2003 16:54:32 PDT."
             <Pine.LNX.4.50L0.0309081651120.876-100000@bolt.sonic.net> 
From: Sean Smith <sws@cs.dartmouth.edu>
Reply-To: Sean Smith <sws@cs.dartmouth.edu>
Date: Tue, 09 Sep 2003 10:13:06 -0400

> 
> >How can you verify that a remote computer is the "real thing, doing
> >the right thing?"
> 
> You cannot.

Using a high-end secure coprocessor (such as the 4758, but not
with a flawed application) will raise the threshold for the adversary
significantly.

No, there are no absolutes.  But there are things you can do.
 
> The correct security approach is to never give a remote machine
> any data that you don't want an untrusted machine to have. 

So you never buy anything online, or use a medical facility
that uses computers?





-- 
Sean W. Smith, Ph.D.                         sws@cs.dartmouth.edu   
http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~sws/       (has ssl link to pgp key)
Department of Computer Science, Dartmouth College, Hanover NH USA




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