[14091] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Digital cash and campaign finance reform
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School )
Mon Sep 8 14:35:53 2003
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Mon, 8 Sep 2003 13:57:18 -0400 (EDT)
From: "Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law" <froomkin@law.miami.edu>
To: Steve Schear <s.schear@comcast.net>
Cc: cypherpunks@lne.com, cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <5.2.1.1.0.20030908094314.03b64c40@mail.comcast.net>
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=60331
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=272787
http://www.cfp2000.org/papers/franklin.pdf
http://www.yale.edu/yup/books/092628.htm
On Mon, 8 Sep 2003, Steve Schear wrote:
> Everyone knows that money is the life blood of politics. The topic of
> campaign finance reform in the U.S. has been on and off the front burner of
> the major media, for decades. Although the ability of citizens and
> corporations to support the candidates and parties of their choice can be a
> positive political force, the ability of political contributors to buy
> access and influence legislation is probably the major source of
> governmental corruption. Despite some, apparently, honest efforts at
> limiting these legal payoffs there has been little real progress. The
> challenge is to encourage "neutral" campaign contributions. Perhaps
> technology could lend a hand.
>
> One of the features of Chaimian digital cash is unlinkability. Normally,
> this has been viewed from the perspective of the payer and payee not
> wishing to be linked to a transaction. But it also follows that that the
> payee can be prevented from learning the identity of the payee even if they
> wished. Since the final payee in politics is either the candidate or the
> party, this lack of knowledge could make it much more difficult for the
> money to be involved in influence peddling and quid pro quo back room deals.
>
> By combining a mandated digital cash system for contributions, a cap on the
> size of each individual contribution (perhaps as small as $100), randomized
> delays (perhaps up to a few weeks) in the "posting" of each transaction to
> the account of the counter party, it could create mix conditions which
> would thwart the ability of contributors to easily convince candidates and
> parties that they were the source of particular funds and therefore
> entitled to special treatment.
>
> Comments?
>
> steve
>
>
> A foolish Constitutional inconsistency is the hobgoblin of freedom, adored
> by judges and demagogue statesmen.
> - Steve Schear
>
>
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