[14089] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive

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Re: Code breakers crack GSM cellphone encryption

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Greg Rose)
Mon Sep 8 14:34:29 2003

X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Tue, 09 Sep 2003 03:39:00 +1000
To: "Anton Stiglic" <astiglic@okiok.com>
From: Greg Rose <ggr@qualcomm.com>
Cc: "John Doe Number Two" <johndoe2@mail.anonymizer.com>,
	<cryptography@metzdowd.com>
In-Reply-To: <015e01c3761f$f921c6f0$3f00a8c0@p1038mobile>

At 11:43 AM 9/8/2003 -0400, Anton Stiglic wrote:
>I think this is different however.  The recent attack focused on the A5/3
>encryption algorithm, while the work of Lucky, Briceno, Goldberg, Wagner,
>Biryukov, Shamir (and others?) was on A5/1 and A5/2 (and other crypto
>algorithms of GSM, such as COMP128, ...).

No, that's not right. The attack *avoids* A5/3, by making the terminal end 
of the call fall back to A5/2, solving for the key in real time, then 
continuing to use the same key with A5/3.

A5/3 (based on Kasumi, and essentially the same as the WCDMA algorithm 
UEA1) is not in any way compromised by this attack.

Greg.


Greg Rose                                       INTERNET: ggr@qualcomm.com
Qualcomm Australia          VOICE:  +61-2-9817 4188   FAX: +61-2-9817 5199
Level 3, 230 Victoria Road,                http://people.qualcomm.com/ggr/
Gladesville NSW 2111    232B EC8F 44C6 C853 D68F  E107 E6BF CD2F 1081 A37C


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