[13975] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: traffic analysis
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (kent@songbird.com)
Fri Aug 29 14:56:30 2003
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
From: kent@songbird.com
Date: Fri, 29 Aug 2003 11:05:47 -0700
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Mail-Followup-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <3F4DF02F.50607@av8n.com>
On Thu, Aug 28, 2003 at 08:06:07AM -0400, John S. Denker wrote:
[...]
> The solution I outlined is modelled after
> procedures that governments have used for decades
> to defend against traffic analysis threats to
> their embassies and overseas military bases.
>
> More specifically, anybody who thinks the scheme
> I described is vulnerable to a timing attack isn't
> paying attention. I addressed this point several
> times in my original note. All transmissions
> adhere to a schedule -- independent of the amount,
> timing, meaning, and other characteristics of the
> payload.
Different models. You state in your previous note that it is important
that all the endpoints be trusted. Traffic between military bases,
embassies etc all involve trusted endpoints. A public website is
intrinsically not a trusted endpoint.
Moreover, addition of "cover browsing" by the hub to random websites
doesn't add any significant protection if the goal is to provide
real-time access.
--
Kent Crispin "Be good, and you will be
crispin@icann.org,kent@songbird.com lonesome."
p: +1 310 823 9358 f: +1 310 823 8649 -- Mark Twain
---------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@metzdowd.com
