[13963] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: traffix analysis
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Steve Schear)
Wed Aug 27 23:39:00 2003
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2003 20:14:14 -0700
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
From: Steve Schear <s.schear@comcast.net>
In-Reply-To: <0f6ee7b464cd21f420c1f16ab8a8781d@remailer.cryptofortress.c
om>
At 09:17 PM 8/27/2003 -0500, Anonymous wrote:
>It will often be possible to also trace the communication channel back
>through the crowd, by inserting delays onto chosen links and observing
>which ones correlate with delays in the data observed at the endpoint.
>This way it is not necessary to monitor all subscribers to the crowd,
>but rather individual traffic flows can be traced.
Using random "throwaway" WiFi neighborhood hotspots can blunt this type of
attack. Even if they trace the link back to the consumer who lent his
bandwidth it may provide scant information.
steve
Experience teaches us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the
government's purpose is beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert
to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest
dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal,
well-meaning but without understanding. -Louis Dembitz Brandeis, lawyer,
judge, and writer (1856-1941)
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