[13962] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: traffix analysis
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Steve Schear)
Wed Aug 27 23:38:20 2003
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Wed, 27 Aug 2003 19:54:10 -0700
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com, jsd@av8n.com
From: Steve Schear <s.schear@comcast.net>
In-Reply-To: <0f6ee7b464cd21f420c1f16ab8a8781d@remailer.cryptofortress.c
om>
At 09:17 PM 8/27/2003 -0500, Anonymous wrote:
> > Then the opponent can put unlimited effort into
> > traffic analysis but won't get anything in return,
> > beyond the _a priori_ obvious fact that some pair
> > of subscribers *may* have communicated.
>
>This is not true, and in fact this result is one of the most important
>to have been obtained in the anonymity community in the past decade. The
>impossibility of practical, strong, real-time anonymous communication has
>undoubtedly played a role in the lack of deployment of such systems.
>
>The attack consists of letting the attacker subvert (or become!) one of
>the communication endpoints. This can be as simple as running a "sting"
>web site offering illegal material.
That's what http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~ashubina/google.html is all about.
steve
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