[139277] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Quantum direct communication: secrecy without key distribution
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Nicolas Williams)
Fri Dec 5 17:51:36 2008
Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2008 15:53:25 -0600
From: Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@sun.com>
To: Eugen Leitl <eugen@leitl.org>
Cc: info@postbiota.org, Cryptography List <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
In-Reply-To: <20081205131608.GO11544@leitl.org>
[I'm guessing that nobody here wants yet another "quatum crypto is snake
oil, no it's not, yes it is, though it has a bright future, no it's not,
..." thread.]
On Fri, Dec 05, 2008 at 02:16:09PM +0100, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> In the last couple of years, we've seen a number of quantum key
> distribution systems being set up that boast close-to-perfect security
> ([4]although they're not as secure as the marketing might imply).
>
> These systems rely on two-part security. The first is the quantum part
> which reveals whether a message has been intercepted or not. Obviously
> this is no use when it comes to sending secret message because it can
> only uncover eavesdroppers after the fact.
That's not the most serious, obvious flaw in quantum cryptography.
The most obvious flaw is that when we're talking fiber optics the
eavesdropper might as well be a man in the middle, and so... well, see
the list archive.
Nico
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