[13806] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: replay & integrity
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Eric Rescorla)
Wed Jul 9 14:01:31 2003
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
To: tom st denis <tomstdenis@yahoo.com>
Cc: iang@systemics.com, cryptography@metzdowd.com
Reply-To: EKR <ekr@rtfm.com>
From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: 09 Jul 2003 10:46:36 -0700
In-Reply-To: <20030709173211.17005.qmail@web41113.mail.yahoo.com>
tom st denis <tomstdenis@yahoo.com> writes:
> --- Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> > This is all fine, but irrelevant to my point, which is that
> > if you're designing a channel security protocol it should
> > provide channel level integrity and anti-replay unless there's
> > some really good reason not to.
>
> For the love of god the horse is dead. Let it be!
>
> I've pulled the code [and the rest of the site]. I admitted you were
> right, I admited it had unintentional flaws.
>
> What more do you want?
Tom,
I'm sorry you're taking this personally, since it's not really
about you. I take Ian to be making a generic argument
that there's not a need for these features in a channel
security protocol. I've certainly hear this argument
before and I think it's worth discussing--even though
I think he's wrong.
-Ekr
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