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Re: Wildcard Certs

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Pete Chown)
Tue Jun 17 07:59:14 2003

X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Tue, 17 Jun 2003 09:57:24 +0100
From: Pete Chown <Pete.Chown@skygate.co.uk>
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <20030616075737.GA18032@diamond.madduck.net>

martin f krafft wrote:

> This strikes me as notoriously bad, although it is in accordance
> with the RFC. I still don't want to accept the usefulness and
> inherent security, so I'd like to get some expert opinions on this.
> 
> Are wildcard certficates good? secure? useful?

I think this is one of the cases where security can't be considered in 
isolation.  It depends what risks you are trying to protect against.  In 
a large company you might want to limit the effects of a key compromise. 
  For example you might want to make sure that someone who steals the UK 
key can't masquerade as the American office.

I can't see any generalised threats that would justify withdrawing 
wildcard certs, but perhaps others can.

-- 
Pete


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