[131169] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: "Cube" cryptanalysis?
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (James Muir)
Wed Aug 20 13:00:35 2008
Date: Wed, 20 Aug 2008 12:12:56 -0400
From: James Muir <jamuir@cs.smu.ca>
To: "cryptography@metzdowd.com" <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
In-Reply-To: <48AB4B73.1000503@qualcomm.com>
Greg Rose wrote:
> Basically, any calculation with inputs and outputs can be represented as
> an (insanely complicated and probably intractable) set of binary
> multivariate polynomials. So long as the degree of the polynomials is
> not too large, the method allows most of the nonlinear terms to be
> cancelled out, even though the attacker can't possibly handle them. Then
> you solve a tractable system of linear equations to recover key (or
> state) bits.
I would like to know how Dinur and Shamir's work differs from Courtois'
previous work on Algebraic cryptanalysis of block ciphers. It is a
refinement of Courtois' technique? Greg, do you, or someone else have
some insight on this?
-James
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