[130171] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Nicolas Williams)
Fri Aug 8 15:20:25 2008
Date: Fri, 8 Aug 2008 13:47:01 -0500
From: Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@sun.com>
To: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com>
Cc: Ben Laurie <benl@google.com>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>,
Dave Korn <dave.korn@artimi.com>, bugtraq@securityfocus.com,
security@openid.net, OpenID List <general@openid.net>,
cryptography@metzdowd.com, full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
In-Reply-To: <87fxpfnzve.fsf@snark.cb.piermont.com>
On Fri, Aug 08, 2008 at 02:08:37PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> The kerberos style of having credentials expire very quickly is one
> (somewhat less imperfect) way to deal with such things, but it is far
> from perfect and it could not be done for the ad-hoc certificate
> system https: depends on -- the infrastructure for refreshing all the
> world's certs every eight hours doesn't exist, and if it did imagine
> the chaos if it failed for a major CA one fine morning.
The PKIX moral equivalent of Kerberos V tickets would be OCSP Responses.
I understand most current browsers support OCSP.
> One also worries about what will happen in the UI when a certificate
> has been revoked. If it just says "this cert has been revoked,
> continue anyway?" the wrong thing will almost always happen.
No doubt.
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