[130167] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Peter Gutmann)
Fri Aug 8 14:00:29 2008
From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
To: dave.korn@artimi.com, ekr@networkresonance.com
Cc: benl@google.com, bugtraq@securityfocus.com,
cryptography@metzdowd.com, full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk,
general@openid.net, security@openid.net
In-Reply-To: <20080808165730.7761450846@romeo.rtfm.com>
Date: Sat, 09 Aug 2008 05:49:42 +1200
Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> writes:
>It's easy to compute all the public keys that will be generated
>by the broken PRNG. The clients could embed that list and refuse
>to accept any certificate containing one of them. So, this
>is distinct from CRLs in that it doesn't require knowing
>which servers have which cert...
You'd also end up with a rather large list for the client to carry around,
which would be especially problematic for lightweight clients. You'd need to
represent it as something like a Bloom filter to avoid this (given that most
users will just click OK on invalid certs, the small false positive rate
shouldn't have much effect either :-).
Peter.
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